Categorization and conceptual behavior in nonhuman primates

This essay describes some of the studies that have been carried out in the past 5 years with two species of baboons, both in laboratory-controlled conditions (Guinea baboons, Papio papio) and in outdoor settings (olive baboons, Papio anubis)

Would humans without language be apes?

The bedrock of comparative psychology of cognition, especially where nonhuman primates are concerned, rests on Darwin's famous account according to which continuity would be the main trait leading from the animal to the human mind. This idea was popularized through the statement in which Darwin postulated only quantitative differences between humans and the other species, namely "the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind" (Darwin, 1871, p. 128)..

Does the use of the dynamic system approach really help fill in the gap between human and non human primate language ? Commentary to S. Shanker and B. J. King " the Emergence of a New Paradigm in Ape Language Research"

The highly recommended transposition of the dynamic system approach for tackling the question of apes’ linguistic abilities has clearly not led to a demonstration that these primates have acquired language. Fundamental differences related to functional modalities – namely, use of the declarative and the form of engagement between mother and infant –can be observed in the way humans and apes use their communicatory systems

Categories as paradigms for comparative cognition

Forming categories is a basic cognitive operation allowing animals to attain concepts, i.e. to represent various classes of objects, natural or artificial, physical or social. Categories can also be formed about the relations holding among these objects, notably similarity and identity. Some of the cognitive processes involved in categorisation will be enumerated. Also, special reference will be made to a much neglected area of research, that of social representations. Here, animals conceive the natural class of their conspecifics as well as the relationships established between them in groups. Two types of social categories were mentioned: (1) intraspecies recognition including recognition of individual conspecifics; and (2) representation of dominance hierarchies and of their transitivity in linear orders

Can culture be solely inferred from the absence of genetic or environmental factors ?

Rendell & Whitehead's minimalist definition of culture does not allow for the important gaps between cetaceans and Inimans. A more complete analysis reveals important discontinuities that may be more instnictive for comparative purposes than the continuities emphasized by the authors

Picture recognition in animals and in humans : a review

The question of object–picture recognition has received relatively little attention in both human and comparative psychology; a paradoxical situation given the important use of image technology (e.g. slides, digitised pictures) made by neuroscientists in their experimental investigation of visual cognition. The present review examines the relevant literature pertaining to the question of the correspondence between and:or equivalence of real objects and their pictorial representations in animals and humans. Two classes of reactions towards pictures will be considered in turn: acquired responses in picture recognition experiments and spontaneous responses to pictures of biologically relevant objects (e.g. prey or conspecifics). Our survey will lead to the conclusion that humans show evidence of picture recognition from an early age; this recognition is, however, facilitated by prior exposure to pictures. This same exposure or training effect appears also to be necessary in nonhuman primates as well as in other mammals and in birds. Other factors are also identified as playing a role in the acquired responses to pictures: familiarity with and nature of the stimulus objects, presence of motion in the image, etc. Spontaneous and adapted reactions to pictures are a wide phenomenon present in different phyla including invertebrates but in most instances, this phenomenon is more likely to express confusion between objects and pictures than discrimination and active correspondence between the two. Finally, given the nature of a picture (e.g. bi-dimensionality, reduction of cues related to depth), it is suggested that object–picture recognition be envisioned in various levels, with true equivalence being a limited case, rarely observed in the behaviour of animals and even humans

Processing of above/below categorical spatial relations by baboons (Papio papio)

Three video-formatted experiments investigated the categorization of ‘above’ and ‘below’ spatial relations in baboons (Papio papio). Using an identity matching-to-sample task, six baboons correctly matched line–dot stimuli based on the ‘above’ or ‘below’ location of the dot relative to the line (Experiment 1). Positive transfer of performance was then observed when the line–dot distance depicted in the sample stimulus differed from that of the two comparison stimuli (Experiment 2). Using a go:nogo procedure, two baboons were further trained to discriminate whether a ‘B’ character was displayed ‘above’ or ‘below’ a ‘3’ character (Experiment 3). After training, a positive transfer of performance was observed with the same type of stimuli depicted in different type fonts. Altogether, these results suggest that baboons may form conceptual representations of ‘above’ and ‘below’ spatial relations, and categorize visual forms on that basis

Nonhuman primates as models of hemispheric specialization

The present chapter concerns the issue of hemispheric specialization for perceptual and cognitive processes. In spite of a long-lasting view that only humans are lateralized (e.g., Warren, 1980), there is now strong documentation for anatomical lateralizations, functional lateralizations, or both in several animal taxa, including birds, rodents, and nonhuman primates (see Bradshaw & Rogers, 1993; Hellige, 1993). We selectively report demonstrations from studies of nonhuman primates. After a short review of the evidence for structural (anatomical) lateralization, we describe..

Associative learning in baboons and humans: Species differences in learned attention to visual features

We examined attention shifting in baboons and humans during the learning of visual categories. Within a conditional matching-to-sample task, participants of the two species sequentially learned two two-feature categories which shared a common feature. Results showed that humans encoded both features of the initially learned category, but predominantly only the distinctive feature of the subsequently learned category. Although baboons initially encoded both features of the first category, they ultimately retained only the distinctive features of each category. Empirical data from the two species were analyzed with the 1996 ADIT connectionist model of Kruschke. ADIT fits the baboon data when the attentional shift rate is zero, and the human data when the attentional shift rate is not zero. These empirical and modeling results suggest species differences in learned attention to visual features

The cognitive revolution in Europe: taking the developmental perspective seriously

We can do little but to share Miller’s view [1] that cognitive psychology was born in the 1950s. However, his article distorts the role of psychology in the birth of cognitive science. On two occasions, Miller proposes that psychology could not play a role in the cognitive revolution because of its narrow focus on behaviorism